垂直差异化与合谋稳定性关系分析

市场行为中的默契合谋能使企业获得超额利润,现存的关于生产同质品和差异化产品的经验性研究经常能发现默契合谋的证据.在现实经济的默契合谋行为中,不同的成本结构适用于不同的经济环境或者不同的行业、产业分析,也直接影响着合谋和背离合谋所得的利润,对合谋稳定性有着重要的影响.在垂直差异化的不同成本(固定成本、可变成本)结构下,企业参与竞争的不同竞争类型(古诺竞争和伯川德竞争)对合谋稳定性的影响也是有差异的.     

天津市海岸特征与开发方向研究

海岸资源是发展海洋经济的主要载体,对海岸资源保护与开发的合理规划,将为海洋经济可持续发展提供保障。本文分析了天津海岸类型、潮间带、水下岸坡、沉积物及其空间分布,以及海洋环境质量、海洋灾害和河口、主要海岸资源的特征,同时分析了天津市海岸开发现状和经济发展对海岸资源的需求,然后将天津市海岸划分11个岸段和6类开发方向,并制定了海岸空间管制措施,为天津市保护与节约集约利用海岸资源提供了借鉴。     

电子商务环境下消费者个体特性与购物行为的差异性分析

通过对高校、企业、党政机关事业单位人员个体特征和网络购物行为调查结果显示,消费者个体特性,即不同年龄、性别、收入及网络经验对网络购物频率和金额存在显著性差异,是影响消费者购物行为的重要因素。主要特征是:月收入8000元以上、网络经验8年以上、年龄在31-35岁之间的消费者的网络购物频率及金额显著高于其他消费者;女性的网络购物频率和购物金额显著高于男性;教育水平在网络购物频率与金额上没有显著性差异。网络零售企业或个人网店,应依据不同性别、年龄、收入和网络经验等制定相应的需求营销策略,以进一步促进自身经营业务健康快速发展。     

Kreps & Scheinkman with Product Differentiation

Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)’s celebrated result is that in a two-stage model of a market with homogeneous products in which firms noncooperatively pick capacities in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is that of a one-shot Cournot game. This note derives capacity best response functions for the first stage and extends the Kreps and Scheinkman result to the case of differentiated products.     

江苏省农业绿色发展水平区域差异及趋势分析

［目的］农业绿色发展是保证我国农业可持续发展的有效方式，探究江苏省农业绿色发展水平和地区差异，为我国其他地区农业绿色发展研究提供参考。［方法］文章采用熵权法和层次分析法确定农业绿色发展水平评价指标权重，运用锡尔指数对区域内和区域间农业绿色发展水平差异进行测度。［结果］2012—2017年江苏省农业绿色发展水平有明显提高，绿色供给的得分最高，环境友好和生态制度的得分最低。各市农业绿色发展水平综合指数分析结果表明，苏州农业绿色发展水平最高，南京、无锡次之，连云港、淮安和宿迁农业绿色发展水平较低。锡尔指数分析结果表明江苏省区域内农业绿色发展水平差异都在逐渐缩小。［结论］农产品绿色供给是江苏省农业绿色发展的最大优势，资源节约利用和环境友好发展方面较低，由于经济发展对资源利用强度在持续增加，资源节约利用仍是绿色发展的短板，因此江苏省资源效益利用仍有上升的空间，且区域内发达地区农业绿色发展的带动效应明显。     

Vertical differentiation,product innovation,and dynamic competition

This paper presents an infinite horizon dynamic model in which two firms compete in a market vertically differentiated by the qualities of their products and consumers have heterogeneous preferences for quality. Given the product qualities offered, the firms engage in price competition that segments the market. In each period each firm can spend on product innovation that if successful increases the quality of its product. Three types of Markov perfect equilibria are identified. A running–coasting equilibrium exhibits increasing quality dominance with one firm undertaking innovation and the other coasting to free ride on the innovation by the first firm. The firm that coasts can have the larger dynamic payoff, so quality dominance does not imply payoff dominance. A second is a leap‐frog equilibrium in which the trailing firm undertakes innovation to leap into the lead. The trailing firm never innovates solely to narrow the gap with the leader, so catch up strategies are never used. In the third both firms undertake innovation, but if both have innovation successes, product differentiation remains the same and profits are reduced by the cost of innovation. The rivalry between Intel and AMD in microprocessors for personal computers provides a motivating example.     

试述用人单位在职业病防治中易忽视的问题及对策

用人单位是《职业病防治法》所规定的各项职业病防治措施的主要落实者,是劳动者职业健康及其相关权益保护的第一责任人。明目张胆违反《职业病防治法》的用人单位减少了,但在具体工作中,办事不严、忽视、执行不到位的情况依然存在。文章列举了这些问题并提出了解决措施。     

Implementing COOL: Comparative welfare effects of different labeling schemes

Country-of-origin labeling (COOL) is being implemented in different forms and degrees in the United States and other countries across the world. The first implementation of mandatory country of origin labeling (MCOOL) in the United States was for seafood in 2005. This is an example of partial MCOOL because it exempts the foodservice sector and excludes processed seafood from labeling. Using a conceptual framework, we analyze the welfare impacts of partial MCOOL when compared to no, voluntary, and total mandatory COOL, taking into account imperfect competition in the downstream markets, information asymmetry, and diversion of low-quality product to the unlabeled market. The model is general enough to apply to any incomplete regulation for which the perceived low-quality product is required to be labeled, such as the labeling of genetically modified food in the European Union. Our results show that when consumers have a strong enough preference for domestic relative to imported product, regulators can overestimate the gain in consumer welfare from partial mandatory labeling if they ignore the diversion of lower quality imports to the unlabeled sector. We show that if the preference for domestic product is large enough, total MCOOL benefits the home market the most overall, including domestic consumers and producers, but not the imperfectly competitive downstream agents. However, if total MCOOL is too costly to implement, partial MCOOL is the second-best solution, but only if consumers falsely believe the unlabeled product to be of higher quality than it truly is. Our results suggest more research is needed to determine the extent to which consumers value the information provided by MCOOL and to enable regulators to consider the welfare impact of diversion in evaluating incomplete mandatory labeling regulations.